Introduction
In this note I seek to analyse and critique the majority judgment of Mogoeng CJ in F v Minister of Safety and Security, 1 in which the judge purports to apply the constitutionalised test for vicarious liability set out by O'Regan J in K v Minister of Safety and Security.
2 However, it is respectfully submitted that a close analysis of the majority judgment in F reveals that Mogoeng CJ to a certain extent misconstrues some of the key conceptual underpinnings of the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Furthermore, Mogoeng CJ subtly alters the constitutionalised test for vicarious liability originally propounded in K. In applying the "standard test" for vicarious liability originally set out in Minister of Police v Rabie,
3 the judge appears to misconstrue the second leg of the enquiry, which calls for an objective assessment of whether or not the conduct of the employee was sufficiently closely linked to the business of his employer to justify the imposition of liability on the employer. The judge seems to overlook the fact that, in terms of K, both factual and normative considerations must be considered in conjunction with one another in deciding whether or not it can be said that, considered overall, there is a sufficiently close link between the employee's delictual conduct and the business of his employer. Instead, Mogoeng CJ appears to consider the question of whether or not there is an "intimate link" between the delictual conduct of the employee and the business of his employer as a separate and subordinate element of the second leg of the standard test, and seems to conceive of this element in primarily factual terms. The judge then, despite making express reference throughout the judgment to the importance  of normative considerations in the enquiry into vicarious liability, appears to base his ultimate findings in the case on this "intimate link" element, understood largely in factual terms, with the result that the final decision to hold the Minister vicariously liable appears to be based primarily on the factual links between the employee's delictual conduct and the business of his employer. This approach is unusual and problematic, as the factual links in this case are, in fact, rather tenuous, and on their own would arguably not justify the imposition of vicarious liability in this situation. It is submitted that a more compelling justification for the imposition of vicarious liability in this instance would have lain in the normative constitutional and policy considerations pointing towards a finding of vicarious liability on the part of the state. In other words, the court should have held that, despite the weak factual links between Van Wyk's conduct and his employment, public policy, informed by relevant constitutional norms, dictates that the link between his conduct and his employment should be deemed to be sufficiently close to justify the imposition of vicarious liability on the state. Such an approach would, it is submitted, comport better with the general thrust and import of the decision in K.
Facts
The appellant was one Ms F ("F"), who was 13 years old when the delict giving rise to the litigation was committed. The first respondent was the Minister of Safety and Security ("the Minister"), while the second respondent was one Allister Claude van
Wyk, who was employed as a police officer by the SAPS at the time of the attack on F.
F went to a nightclub one night. In the early hours of the morning, she accepted a lift home from Van Wyk. Two other persons, one of whom was known to her, were also passengers in Van Wyk's car, an unmarked police vehicle. Before accepting the lift from Van Wyk, F noticed that the vehicle was fitted with a police radio, and from this inferred that he must be a police officer.
Van Wyk dropped off the two passengers in the vehicle at their respective homes.
He then invited F to get into the front passenger seat, which she did. She then noticed a pile of what she believed to be police dockets in the car. At some point prior to the rape, Van Wyk also told F he was a "private detective", and F understood this to mean he was a police officer.
Crucially, Van Wyk was not on duty on the night in question; however, he was on standby duty, which meant he could be called upon to attend to any crime-related incident if the need arose. He was paid an hourly tariff by the SAPS for being on standby, and had been provided with an unmarked police vehicle for this purpose.
After Van Wyk had dropped off the two passengers, he drove the vehicle in a direction away from F's home, whereupon she became fearful for her safety. When the car slowed down in a dark, secluded spot, she got out of the vehicle, ran away and hid herself. She waited for Van Wyk's vehicle to drive off, and then stood next to the road and attempted to hitchhike home. However, Van Wyk returned to the scene while she was attempting to do this. She reluctantly got into his car again, owing to her desperation. F testified that she got into the car again because she believed Van Wyk was a police officer, because he had told her he was a private detective, and because this statement had been corroborated by the police radio and dockets she had seen in the vehicle. While ostensibly taking F home, Van Wyk turned off the road. F again attempted, this time unsuccessfully, to escape. Van Wyk then assaulted and raped her.
F sued the Minister for damages arising out of the attack, alleging that the Minister was vicariously liable for Van Wyk's conduct. She claimed that the fact that she had believed Van Wyk to be a police officer had played a crucial role in allaying her fears.
She alleged that she had trusted him, despite her suspicions, because she believed he was a police officer.
F was successful in her action in the court a quo, 4 but this decision was overturned by the Supreme Court of Appeal ("the SCA"). 5 The decision of the SCA was then 4 F liability, which favors minimal responsibility of employers, including the state, for the conduct of employees, and the constitutionally inspired approach, which places greater responsibility for the safety of the public and accountability of employers and the state for the risks and harms they impose on the public.
[K]… fosters a culture of public accountability and of protecting the rights of vulnerable members of its society". from violent crime. 21 In K three police officers -on duty, in uniform and driving a marked police vehicle -had assaulted and raped a woman to whom they had offered a lift. In essence, the Constitutional Court held that the test for vicarious liability in the context of South Africa's constitutional democracy has both a factual and a normative component.
The court endorsed the "standard test" set out in Rabie, holding that the enquiry into vicarious liability has both a subjective and an objective element to it. However, the court significantly extended the Rabie test by holding that, in applying the objective leg of the test, the court must consider both the factual link 22 between the conduct of the wrongdoer employee and the business of his employer and the normative question of whether or not the court should impose liability on the state in that instance, taking into account relevant constitutional, statutory and policy considerations. would factually be a close connection. Presumably this is the easy part of the close connection, meaning closeness to the employment or authorised acts of the employee. It would probably include acts which on the surface are similar to the employment of the employee, such as doing the wrongful act while doing authorised acts, or acts closely resembling authorised acts, and in the time and the place where the employee has to do his or her job."
23
The court extended the test for vicarious liability largely on the basis of s 39(2) of the Constitution, which provides that "... when developing the common law … every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights". Fagan 2009 SALJ 178-192 has criticised the manner in which this section has been interpreted as a justification for the court mero motu revising common-law rules to bring them into line with the values of the Bill of Rights or the Constitution more generally. His view appears to be that the court should engage in this process only when the common law has been shown to be wanting, and the court is therefore already in the process of developing it.
as to whether or not it can be said that there is a sufficiently close link between the wrongdoer's conduct and the business of his employer.
24
The court in K also expressly rejected the notion that the "standard test" for vicarious liability set out in Rabie was exclusively a factual enquiry. O'Regan J held that "characterising the application of the common-law principles of vicarious liability as a matter of fact untrammelled by any considerations of law or normative principle cannot be correct". In applying the constitutionalised concept of vicarious liability to the facts of the matter, the judge accepted that, from a subjective standpoint, the police officers in question had acted purely selfishly in raping K. With regard to whether or not it could be said that there was a sufficiently close link between their conduct and the business of their employer, the court held that there was such a close connection.
The court arrived at this conclusion for three main reasons. 30 First, the police officers were under a statutory and constitutional duty to protect the applicant, and this was a duty which also rested on their employer. Second, the police had offered to assist the applicant, and she had accepted their offer, reasonably placing her trust in them.
Third, the conduct of the police officers constituted simultaneously an act of commission (the rape of K) and one of omission (a failure to perform their statutorily and constitutionally mandated role of protecting the public). O'Regan J held that, cumulatively:
... these three inter-related factors make it plain that viewed against the background of our constitution, and, in particular, the constitutional rights of the applicant and the constitutional obligations of the respondent, the connection between the conduct of the policemen and their employment was sufficiently close to render the respondent liable.
31
Thus, the decision to impose vicarious liability on the state in K was essentially based on an intricate blend of factual and normative considerations. The court did not make any general comments regarding the weight that should be accorded to normative, as opposed to factual, considerations in deciding the objective leg of the enquiry. 32 It would therefore seem that each case will have to be decided on its own merits. 33 However, the general import of K would seem to be that even a fairly weak factual link between the conduct of the employee wrongdoer and the business of his the normative values of the constitution direct the policy that must influence the decision and they do so in relation to the objective element of the test, ie the closeness in relationship between the conduct of the employee and the business of the employer. … It is no longer necessary, if the constitutional norms so dictate, to limit the proximity to those cases where the employee, although deviating from the course or scope of employment, is nevertheless acting in furtherance of the employer's business when the deviation occurs."
35
As such, key constitutional considerations, such as the right to equality and the right to freedom and security of the person, will play an important role in deciding whether or not to impose vicarious liability, given that constitutional norms now inform the court's understanding of the legal convictions of the community/policy (see Gardener v Whitaker 1995 2 SA 672 (E) 684).
36
In this respect, the considerations a court will be required to canvass in deciding whether or not to impose vicarious liability in any given instance will be very similar to those a court will consider in deciding the question of wrongfulness in an enquiry into personal liability. It is for this reason that Froneman J, in his separate but concurring judgment, feels that the cumbersome enquiry into vicarious liability can be replaced with a more straightforward one into wrongfulness based on direct state liability. Boonzaaier 2013 SALJ is supportive of this approach,
given the many difficulties associated with imposing vicarious liability on state agencies in circumstances where institutional and system failures have led to harm being suffered by a member of the public, but where fault cannot be attributed to any particular employee or group of employees. Botha and Millard 2012 De Jure 252 believe that a plaintiff should have the option of choosing whether to institute an action against the state on the basis of vicarious or direct state liability. They write that "... Froneman J's judgment paves the way for recognising the possibility of direct liability and that the time is ripe for employing that particular cause of action". 
The state's constitutional obligations to protect the public
Mogoeng CJ pointed out that the crime of rape violates a cluster of interconnected fundamental rights protected by the Bill of Rights, including the rights to equality (section 9), dignity (section 10), freedom and security of the person (section 12), and privacy (section 14). 42 Thus, the judge concluded that "... the state, through its foremost agency against crime, the police service, bears the primary responsibility to protect women and children against this prevalent plague of violent crimes".
43
Mogoeng CJ emphasised that, in deciding questions of vicarious liability, the courts must apply the rules "through the prism of constitutional norms". 44 The judge held that the constitutional duties on the state, and especially the SAPS, to protect the public against crime:
. of the fact that she believed he was employed by the SAPS. Accordingly, even though he was not on duty or in uniform at the time of the commission of the rape, the fact that he was employed by the SAPS was nevertheless an integral factor in the commission of the crime/delict, and therefore intimately linked to it. Thus, the trust which F placed in Van Wyk created a factual link between Van Wyk's employment by the SAPS and his commission of the crime/delict, justifying the imposition of vicarious liability in this instance.
But the trust issue is also cited as a normative factor justifying the imposition of vicarious liability. Mogoeng CJ's judgment therefore suggests that there is also a normative component with regard to this issue. 47 The SAPS have a constitutional duty to protect the public, and especially women and children, from violent crime. In order to discharge this constitutional duty, the trust of the public, and especially women, in its activities and personnel is essential. In this instance, the trust that a member of the public had placed in the SAPS had been betrayed, thus impeding the discharge of the core constitutional duty to uphold the dignity and equality of accord with the sense of justice in the community and deter future such breaches of trust by the SAPS, thereby vindicating F's, and other women's, constitutional rights to dignity and equality. This, in turn, would facilitate better policing and the protection of the core constitutional rights in question.
On duty/off duty
Mogoeng CJ rejects the notion that whether Van Wyk was on or off duty is finally determinative of the question of whether or not vicarious liability should be imposed on the SAPS in this instance, largely on the basis that an ordinary member of the public, such as F, would place his/her trust in a policeman simply by virtue of the fact that he was a policeman, regardless of whether he was on or off duty. 48 In this regard, Mogoeng CJ rejects the emphasis placed on the on/off duty issue by the Supreme Court of Appeal. However, he accepts that whether a policeman was on or off duty at the time of the wrongful conduct is relevant to the question of whether, objectively speaking, there is a sufficiently close factual link between the wrongful conduct of the policeman and the business of his employer. 49 Here Mogoeng CJ appears impliedly to acknowledge that the fact that Van Wyk was not on duty at the time of the commission of the crime weakens the factual link between his actions and the business of his employer, although it does not destroy it altogether. 
Act of commission/omission
Mogoeng CJ rejects the finding of the majority in the SCA that the imposition of vicarious liability on the SAPS in K was based solely on the failure on the part of the SAPS to act to protect K from harm. Quoting from K, Mogoeng CJ points out that the imposition of vicarious liability was based on three interrelated factors -the act of rape (commission), the general failure on the part of the SAPS to act to protect the public, and the specific failure on the part of the SAPS officers in question to protect Unlike before, when the test in deviation cases was whether the employee acted within the course and scope of employment, the focus now is whether the connection between the conduct of the policemen and their employment was sufficiently close to render the respondent liable.
62
The above statement seems to suggest that the course and scope rule has been abandoned in deviation cases and replaced by the Rabie "standard test". appear to have appreciated that the judgement finally does away with the requirement that the employee must be acting within the course and scope of her employment for vicarious liability to be imposed in the deviation cases". It is submitted that this interpretation of Mogoeng CJ's pronouncement is wrong. It does not appear from the judgment that the chief justice intended to make this drastic and far-reaching change to the law of vicarious liability. In any event, the course and scope rule is the foundational principle of the doctrine. To abandon it would render the law of vicarious liability meaningless, in this and other contexts. It is usually not necessary for a court to look at the closeness of the link between the conduct of the employee and the business of the employer in cases where the employee has plainly caused sufficiently close link, the employee will be regarded in law as having committed the delict in the course and scope of his employment, and the liability of the employer will ensue.
Mogoeng CJ goes on to state that the first step of the process in determining vicarious liability is ascertaining the subjective state of mind of the employee wrongdoer at the time he/she caused the harm. In terms of his application of the first leg of the Rabie enquiry, Mogoeng CJ correctly identifies that Van Wyk acted purely selfishly, and that he did not seek subjectively to promote the interests of the SAPS in raping F:
Mr van Wyk did not rape Ms F in the furtherance of the constitutional mandate of his employer. He was not, and could not have been, ordered by his employer to do so. He acted in pursuit of his own selfish interests. Accordingly, the first leg of the K test, which is subjective, does not establish state liability here. What remains to be considered is whether the requirements of the second leg of the test are met.
66
This statement appears to suggest that vicarious liability will be conclusively established where it can be shown that the employee, in causing the harm, subjectively sought to further the interests of his employer, and that, if this were the case, it would not be necessary for the court to go further and examine the objective closeness of the link between the employee's conduct and the business of his employer. However, it is submitted that, when a court is dealing with the application of the Rabie standard test, both the subjective and the objective components of the test must be addressed in all cases, even when the employee wrongdoer subjectively intended to act in the interests of his employer. It is not inconceivable that an employee could subjectively intend to further his employer's interests, but in fact engage in conduct which had no relation whatsoever to the duties he was employed to discharge. In such an instance, it would plainly be inappropriate and unreasonable for a court to impose vicarious liability on the employer. In other words, it is submitted that in all cases the court must consider the matter both subjectively and objectively to decide whether or not to impose vicarious liability. It the harm while performing the duties for which he was appointed. In such cases, the link is selfevident.
F para 51.
is especially important to do so given that the standard test now incorporates constitutional/normative considerations, making the test for vicarious liability inherently evaluative and policy-based. 67 As pointed out above, subsequent to the decision in K, the ultimate question for a court in deciding on a deviation case is whether the court should impose liability on the employer, taking into account both the strength of the factual link between the employee's conduct and the business of his employer and the constitutional norms and other policy considerations in issue.
This question can obviously not be properly addressed unless the second, objective leg of the Rabie test has been fully canvassed.
When one considers Mogoeng CJ's treatment of the second leg of the enquiry, several conceptual difficulties become apparent. In this regard, Mogoeng CJ appears to blur the second leg's overall question of the closeness of the link between the employee's wrongful conduct and the business of the employer with the various subordinate factual and policy questions 68 which the court is required to examine in order to decide this overall question. Mogoeng CJ identifies the question of whether or not there is an "intimate link" between the conduct of the employee and the business of his employer as one of the normative issues to be examined in order to decide whether or not vicarious liability should be imposed on the employer. In fact, this is the overall issue which needs to be determined by means of the second leg of the Rabie test.
69 This "intimate link" issue receives its own heading, 70 and is dealt 67 In this regard, it is submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeal did not approach the question of vicarious liability from a purely subjective standpoint in Minister of Safety and Security v Luiters 2006 4 SA 160 (SCA). In this case, Luiters had been shot by an off-duty police officer. The SCA held that the police officer had placed himself on duty when he shot Luiters, and had therefore subjectively intended to further the interests of the Minister at the time of his delictual conduct. However, it is clear from the judgment that the court also considered objective factors in deciding that the police officer in question was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the relevant time.
68
For example, the state's constitutional duty to protect the public from violent crime, the trust the public is entitled to place in the police, and the factual links between the delictual conduct of the employee and the business of his employer.
69
Scott 2012 TSAR 552 picks up on this issue by pointing out that the last of the "... normative factors" identified by Mogoeng CJ in his judgment is not really a normative component in its own right, but rather concerns the concrete application of the preceding normative factors to the facts of the case under consideration. This point is reiterated in Scott 2013 TSAR 359-360. 70 Mogoeng CJ initially uses the term "intimate link" to identify this issue, but then later uses the phrase "sufficiently close link" as the heading to the section dealing with this issue.
with separately from the other constitutional/policy issues considered in terms of the second leg of the Rabie test. 71 In contrast, O'Regan J's judgment clearly conceived of the closeness of the link as the overall question to be decided when looking at the second leg of the Rabie test. In terms of O'Regan J's reasoning, the court would be required to look at a whole range of factual and normative considerations in order to answer this overarching question.
Mogoeng CJ also writes, in discussing the role of the state's constitutional obligations to protect the public in deciding the question of vicarious liability, that:
...
[t]hese constitutional duties resting upon the State, and more specifically the police, are significant in that they suggest a normative basis for holding the State liable for the wrongful conduct of even a policeman on standby duty, provided a sufficiently close connection can be determined between his misdeed and his employment. The confusion is evident also in Mogoeng CJ's consideration of the issue of trust as one of the factors pointing to the closeness of the link between Van Wyk's conduct and the business of the SAPS. After pointing out that the issue of trust operates both factually and normatively to indicate the closeness of the link, the judge then states that "...
[w]hat matters is whether the trust placed in him as a policeman by a vulnerable member of the public, creates a sufficiently close connection between his delictual conduct and his employment. This I address later in this judgment" (F para 68). It is not clear why this issue needs to be addressed again, and separately, under the "intimate link" heading, unless Mogoeng CJ conceives of the "intimate link" criterion as a separate and additional factor justifying the imposition of vicarious liability. As pointed out above, the "intimate link" issue is really the general and overall question the court needs to assess in deciding the second leg of the Rabie standard test, after looking at the full range of factual and normative considerations -including the issue of trust -relevant to determining the overall question. Thus, Mogoeng CJ's approach is not properly in alignment with that set out by O'Regan J in K. Mogoeng CJ compartmentalises the test in a manner which is contrary to the approach adopted in K, where the factual and normative issues were considered together in order to decide whether, objectively speaking, the link should be regarded as close enough to justify the imposition of vicarious liability. This discrepancy between the reasoning of the two judgments is significant in that It is so that Mr Van Wyk was not in uniform, that his police car was unmarked and he was not on duty but on standby. But his use of a police car facilitated the rape. That he was on standby is not an irrelevant consideration. His duty to protect the public while on standby was incipient. But it must be seen as cumulative to the rest of the factors that point to the necessary connection. He could be summoned at any time to exercise his powers as a police official to protect a member of the public. What is more, in that time and space he had the power to place himself on duty. I am therefore satisfied that a sufficiently close link existed to impose vicarious liability on Mr Van Wyk's employer. ... In conclusion: the police vehicle, which was issued to him precisely because he was on standby duty, enabled Mr Van Wyk to commit the rape. It enhanced his mobility and enabled him to give a lift to Ms F. Further, when Ms F re-entered the vehicle, she understood Mr Van Wyk to 73 The term "intimate link" is not defined, but it would appear from Mogoeng CJ's judgment that he understands it to be primarily the factual linkages between Van Wyk's wrongful conduct and the business of the SAPS. Thus, it would seem that whether or not it can be said that there was an "intimate link" between Van Wyk's conduct and the business of his employer is largely a factual question for the purposes of Mogoeng CJ's judgment.
74
F paras 80-81.
be a policeman. She made this deduction from the dockets and the police radio in the vehicle. In other words, he was identifiable as a policeman. And, in fact, he was a policeman.
75
The above excerpt from the judgment stands in stark contrast with how scantily Mogoeng CJ addresses the normative aspect of the test, which appears tangential, rather than "pivotal", to the resolution of the issue:
76
Pivotal is the normative component of the connection test. Beyond her subjective trust in Mr Van Wyk is the fact that any member of the public and in particular one who requires assistance from the police, is entitled to turn to and repose trust in a police official.
77
Ironically, given Mogoeng CJ's emphasis on factual considerations in deciding the matter, the factual links between Van Wyk's conduct and his employment as a police officer were in this case rather insubstantial. He was on standby duty at the time of the assault and rape of F, and therefore was not on duty when he committed the delict. The fact that he was being paid an hourly tariff by the SAPS to be on standby does not mean that he was on duty at the relevant time -it simply means that he was being remunerated for agreeing in advance to go on duty if he was called upon to do so. In addition, the car in question was an unmarked police vehicle, he was not authorised to use it for social purposes, 78 and Van Wyk was not in uniform at the time of the incident. He also did not intend to act as a police officer in offering F a lift; he had met, interacted with and offered her a lift in a purely casual social context. It may also be argued that F did not act reasonably in accepting a lift from a man she did not know simply on the basis that she believed he was employed as a 75 F paras 80-81.
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While Mogoeng CJ does extensively discuss a range of normative issues prior to this point of the judgment, it is clear from the contours of the judgment that they were, at best, only of background importance. They do not appear to be integrated into his final analysis of the issues, or to have been an important immediate driver of his ultimate conclusions. O'Regan J in K, in which the basis of the decision to impose vicarious liability was primarily a range of constitutional and policy norms, and not the factual links between the on-duty policemen's conduct and the business of the SAPS.
Conclusion
The constitutionalised approach to vicarious liability set out by O'Regan J in K has been justifiably described as revolutionary and groundbreaking. In providing that policy considerations and other norms must now play a direct and pivotal role in deciding questions of vicarious liability, the Constitutional Court gave the green light for courts to impose vicarious liability on employers in circumstances where the factual links between the conduct of the tortfeasor employee and the business of his employer were weak, but where compelling policy considerations existed to justify the imposition of vicarious liability on the employer. In the majority judgment in the F, Mogoeng CJ expressly emphasises the importance policy considerations now play in deciding questions of vicarious liability, and proceeds to set these out in some detail. However, a close reading of the judgment reveals that it was, in fact, the factual linkages that existed between the wrongdoer employee's conduct and the business of the SAPS which led the judge to make a finding of vicarious liability in this instance. This approach is unusual and contrary to the import of K, where the 
